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### **POLISH COOPERATION IN THE FIRST THIRD OF THE XX CENTURY: FORMATION, FEATURES OF DEVELOPMENT**

**Introduction.** Cooperation and the cooperative movement play a particularly important role in transition periods, in the periods of so-called transit economies and the formation of civil society. Today, the international experience of economic self-organization of the society is extremely relevant for Ukraine.

**The methodology** of the research is based on the principles of historical knowledge, such as science, historicism, objectivity, systematic analysis, etc., as well as use of general scientific, special historical and special source methods.

**The scientific novelty** is that a comprehensive study of the formation and development of national cooperation in Poland has been conducted. All-European tendencies of development of cooperative movement were specified. It turned out that the peculiarity of Polish cooperation was that the Poles did not have their own state and were under the influence of the legislation and the level of the economy of various European states. The Polish intelligentsia, large national capital, and general democratic tendencies formed under the influence of wars and revolutions, played an important role in the development of the national cooperative movement.

**Conclusions.** Thus, in the early twentieth century in Europe, the spread of cooperation was seen as means of economic and national-cultural revival. The latter factor led to increased interest in the cooperative form of self-organization of the population by the intelligentsia of the imperial states. On the other hand, the authorities of the region, responding to the success of the development of the cooperative movement in neighboring countries, hoped for its positive contribution to the rise of the predominantly agrarian economy of their countries and the stabilization of social

relations. In general, agrarian Europe was becoming industrial and cooperation, as a form of mitigating social conflicts, either became the subject of research, or fell out as one that was competing with the ideology of state parties.

All segments of the population actively participated in the cooperative movement; especially the peasantry, which in many cases initiated the creation of societies. Despite various shortcomings (ignorance of members, lack of work experience, abuse by managers, etc.), they played an important role in improving the economic situation of the population: significantly reduced prices for consumer goods, provided the necessary funds and knowledge to improve the economy, helped organize production and sales of products, contributed to raising the level of agricultural culture.

In general, cooperation was an important element not only of economic prosperity. Contributing to raising the level of literacy, caring for the well-being of the population, they gradually became an important element of public life. This is especially evident in the examples of women's cooperatives. The formation of a women's economic organization was a significant step in the process of women's self-affirmation, and required great efforts to ensure its functioning. It was through cooperation that women were given a chance to have economic and later political independence.

**Key words:** ICA, Raiffeisen, Polish cooperators, self-emancipation, Społem.

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### **INFLUENCE OF THE PEASANT FACTOR ON THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE BOLSHEVIKS IN THE UKRAINIAN COUNTRYSIDE (1919 - 1921)\***

As a result of the study, the thesis that the revolutionary activity of the peasantry was conditioned by the Bolshevik revision of the doctrinal principles of the policy of "war communism", and subsequently the rejection of the policy of "war communism", the introduction of the NEP were substantiated. The policy of "war communism" - the policy of "communist assault", "socialist front in the countryside", curtailment of commodity-money relations.

**Key words:** Bolshevik economic policy, policy of "war communism", new economic policy, Ukrainian peasantry, Ukrainian revolution.

**Problem statement.** The beginning of the XX century in the history of Ukrainian nation-building is marked by radical shifts caused by the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921. Given this, the scientific interest in socio-political shocks and socio-economic transformations of 1917-1921

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is intensified and constant both from domestic and foreign historians [1; 2]. It is quite natural, given the scale, radicalism of the changes caused by this socio-cultural phenomenon. The interest of scientists and the phenomenon of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921, as the economic policy of the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian countryside during 1919 - 1921, were not lost [3].

According to the authors, the understanding of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921 is new as a multidimensional, holistic historical and socio-cultural phenomenon. Among all its components the most prominent was the peasant [4]. Accordingly, the peasantry was an active subject of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 - 1921. This gives us reason to speak about the peasant nature of the Ukrainian revolution. At the same time, this does not contradict the fact that the Ukrainian revolution is national democratic.

One of the proofs that the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 – 1921 had a peasant nature is that the way in which one or another authority would solve an agrarian question, determined its political future. The nature of the peasantry's relations with any government largely determined the constructive or destructive orientation of the socio-political activity of the peasantry, which, along with the course of events on the fronts, ultimately determined the final of the Ukrainian Revolution. In fact, the failures and defeats of the Central Council, the Hetmanate, the Directorate of the UPR, the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, and Soviet power were largely due to the peasant factor.

**The purpose** of the paper is to investigate the influence of the peasant factor on the evolution of the Bolshevik economic policies in the Ukrainian countryside during 1919-1921. The basis of the analysis is the policy of “war communism” implemented by the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian countryside, the influence of the peasant factor on its transformation, and subsequently its rejection. The study of these examples clarifies the role of the peasant factor in the changes in the economic policy of the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian countryside during 1919-1921.

The methodological basis of the study was the concept of the “Great Peasant Revolution”, proposed in the scientific work of V. Danilova, T. Shanin. Its main provisions were further developed in the latest achievements of N. Kovaleva, I. Faraniy, S. Kornovenko and other scholars. Peasant revolution of the early twentieth century was the deep foundation of all the revolutionary transformations experienced by Ukraine in the first decades of the twentieth century. It was against the backdrop of the peasant revolution that other revolutions - social, political, etc. - unfolded. For the core methodological benchmark of our study, we identified a socio-cultural approach. One of the signs of the socio-cultural paradigm is a certain universalism, which makes it possible to study cultural, political, economic and other elements of the social whole, as well as society as a unity of culture and sociality. Against this backdrop, the peasantry at the beginning of the twentieth century appears as a socio-cultural phenomenon – a way of organization of life, in which the ground, the work on it, the peasant on his own closely interconnected; peasantry - the conservative basis of

civilization as a form of culture, statehood as a way of socio-cultural organization. Peasant economy as a socio-cultural phenomenon, object and subject of agrarian policy, firstly, occupies a certain place in the social division of labor; and secondly, a peculiar micro-socium; and thirdly, the structural component of the Ukrainian revolutionary society of that time.

#### **The statement of the basic material.**

#### **REPRESENTATION OF THE BOLSHEVIKS ABOUT THE PEASANTS**

The attitude of the Bolsheviks towards the peasantry, in general, and the Ukrainian one, was formed under the influence of the sociopolitical practice of the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the basic principles of Marxism. They also, for their doctrinal principles, used the idea of peasant inferiority, taking it on their arsenal [5]. Bolshevik leaders, in their understanding of the peasantry, were captured by class-revolutionary utopias. They developed the concept of peasantry as an ally of the proletariat in the struggle for a bright future. However, the proletariat proclaimed the hegemon, which supposedly had nothing to lose except its own chains [6]. That approach cannot be considered as justified. The peasant, in accordance with the Marxist interpretation, was seen as a subject with “dual psychology”. V. Lenin wrote: “A peasant is a worker because he then extracts his bread with his blood, it is exploited by the landowners, capitalists, merchants. The peasant is a speculator, because he sells bread, an object of necessity, an item that, when there aren't it, is worth giving all the property for it. Hunger is not the aunt; for a bread they give a thousand rubles and as much as they can, even though all the property” [7, 82], and not to the proletariat - the bearer of power and statehood.

“Culturally, politically,” the peasantry, on the conviction of the Bolshevik leaders, was different from the proletariat, more backward, more archaic. It was on the path to a bright future, modeled by Marxist-Leninist, who needed a guide in the face of the Bolshevik Party and the proletariat as an ally “on the road to communism”. In this regard, V. Lenin clearly stated: “We need – in accordance with our outlook, our revolutionary experience for decades, the lessons of our revolution - to ask the question directly: the interests of these two classes are different, the small farmer does not want what the worker wants. We know that only an agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia until the revolution in other countries has come” [8, 82].

The leaders of the RCP (b), as noted by the Ukrainian communists, in their understanding of Ukrainian realities, took into account only two points: the theoretical system of Bolshevism and Russian reality. For them, the Ukrainian SSR seemed to be an economically backward region, frankly kulak [8]. “Ukraine is an agricultural country with a weakly developed industrial proletariat ... The social composition of the Ukrainian countryside is marked by the presence of two opposite poles: the poor and the kulaks. The middle peasant, in the sense, as he is understood in Russia, is extremely close to the kulak, he merges with him. This explains the kulak nature of the entire regions of Ukraine” [9]. The Bolsheviks saw the difference between the Russian and Ukrainian countryside in the fact that in the last “top” - a “strong,



firmly united stratum” that forms around itself, organizes other layers of the peasantry [10]. From this, a “conclusion” was made that in Ukraine, the revolution, given the “kulak dominance”, is impossible, and therefore “assistance” of the Russian proletariat is needed [11].

In practice, that was recognized by such well-known at that time Ukrainian communists as P. Popov, Y. Larin, and O. Zorin, which was reduced to an unbreakable colonial policy of Russia towards Ukraine, aimed at pumping out material resources from the region. The Russian Bolsheviks did not count on the peculiarities of the class struggle in the republic [11]. The foreign “support” of the revolution in Ukraine, - the leaders of the RCP (b) have been thinking, - are doomed to a fiasco unless it will have strong support among the poor and middle-prosperous peasantry. In this regard, Ukrainian colleagues strongly recommended to implement two measures: 1) to diversify the property differentiation of the peasantry in every possible way, “as a condition for the approval of the power of the Soviets”; 2) mass creation of communes, party cells in the countryside in order to combine efforts of the rural poor and agricultural producers in their struggle for a “bright future” [12].

However, the peasant is a practitioner, - the Bolsheviks reasonably think, - and therefore it is necessary to carry out such an economic policy, which will allow to establish Soviet power in the Ukrainian countryside in reality. Above, the Soviet leadership considered it worthwhile to focus the peasantry on purely economic aspects, diverting from political [13]. For example, M. Skrypyk in one conversation directly spoke about the fact that, on the one hand, the peasants of the Kyiv region were a dark mass, and on the other hand, a suitable ground for the bright ideas of communism [14]. For this, it is necessary to strengthen and deepen the material differentiation among the peasantry of the Right Bank, combining the rural proletariat, the poor, involving the middle peasants, and all of them together to oppose the kulaks.

In this system of manipulation a prominent place was given to economic policy [15]. Through its implementation it was intended to strengthen the Bolshevik position in the Ukrainian countryside. In fact, using the slogan popular among farmers, declaring war to landlordism, Russian revolutionaries fanned the flames of confrontation between peasant strata, imperceptibly confirming their own power [16].

At the same time, from the high tribunes, in particular at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b), a thrifty, especially kind attitude to the peasantry was proclaimed [17]. For example, Lenin at the aforementioned meeting urged party members not to abuse the peasants not command them, and to adapt to the conditions of life, to work towards their welfare arrangement [18].

For the organs of Soviet power on the ground, it was required strictly to adhere to the decisions of the leaders of the republic, in particular, to prevent the spread of “rumors” that the Bolsheviks introduced the communes in the countryside [19]. They were encouraged to make advances to the peasantry, not to introduce without their consent the collective farms, state

farms, but to give preference to the rural proletariat, to deprive the “soil” of the ground [20].

According to the analysis of the source material, the Soviet authorities in the countryside specifically understood what the center demanded of them, responding in their own way to circulars from above. For example, in the Novomoskovsk district of Katerynoslav guberniya peasants complained that none of their appeals to Soviet authorities was not satisfied. They were told that they could not prevent anything by sending them to the district or guberniya. The authorities found complete inaction even in providing assistance to firefighters. Its actions were “substantiated” by its representatives by the fact that “nothing depends on them” [21]. In Radomyśl district Kombids, performing administrative functions, did not do anything, did not even distribute among the peasants of the landlord land, having neglected all estates [22]. The similar situation took place in Pryluky, Konotop districts in the Poltava guberniya [23].

Thus, for the Bolsheviks, the peasantry, in general, and Ukrainian in particular, seemed to be an inert, conservative mass, incapable, without the leading role of the party and the urban proletariat, in being an active subject of the revolution. In such an interpretation of the peasantry, the Bolshevik leaders were not original. In essence, they duplicated a similar understanding of the peasantry by representatives of the tsarist establishment. The formation of a new peasant of time of the revolution – an active subject of history – took place out of their sight.

#### THE CONTENT OF THE POLICY OF “WAR COMMUNISM” AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEASANTRY TO IT

According to some researchers, before the beginning of the revolution, the socialist view of the new system was abstract. The main thing, in their conviction, was the seizure of power. Menshevik B. Nikolayevsky wrote: “Despite the almost overthrow of socialism by the Russian intelligentsia at the end of the past and the beginning of this century”, we were almost not studying the theory of socialism. The task of destroying the old order so powerfully dominated our consciousness that the great problems of socialism were of little interest to us” [24].

We defend the thesis that the Bolsheviks had an idea of the future system. It was based on the development of this topic by Marx and F. Engels. Another thing is that the adherents of doctrinal Marxism did not count on the realities of life, aiming for the fastest realization of their “faithful” plans.

One of the tools for the spread, establishment and strengthening of Soviet power in the Ukrainian countryside was the policy of “war communism”. The authors agree with D. Mykhailychenko’s thesis that the policy of “war communism” is the core of Bolshevik politics in the countryside in general and in Ukrainian in particular. It was not due to objective circumstances [25]. To a greater extent, it corresponded to the Bolshevik notions of a “bright future”, the builders of which they believed themselves.

An important component of the policy of “war communism” in the Ukrainian countryside was the



prodrazvyorstka, introduced on January 11, 1919. According to it, the Bolsheviks required the peasants to hand over bread to the state at solid prices. Article 1 of the decree “On the overturn between the producing guberniyas of grain breads and forage, which are subject to alienation in the disposal of the state” laid down the basic principle of taxation of the countryside: “All the breads, grain forage”, necessary to meet state needs, is being developed for the alienation of the population among the producers provinces”. Subsequently it was extended to other crops: potatoes, flax, fur, leather, meat, dairy products, etc. In practice, this meant that the prodrazvyorstka actually replaced the tax and procurement system. The only purchaser of bread was declared by the state in the person of its body - the People’s Commissariat. The state assumed the role of food supplier to the population. In fact, private trade was prohibited in the country, although legally the RNC decision of January 21, 1919 “On the procurement of food products” obliged the Soviet authorities to ensure that the free supply of goods to the market (except for bread, sugar, tea, salt, meat and fats) and their sale “no obstacles or complications to anyone; to bring the perpetrators to justice to the Revolutionary Tribunal” [26].

The state established precise obligations on the delivery of agricultural products for the province, counties, townships, villages and individual peasant farms. Prodrazvyorstka was implemented as a natural conscription with forced alienation of the quantity of products required for the state. Its introduction meant the abandonment of the previous accounting of surplus. The official documents of that time were reported: “... the prodrazvyorstka received by the authorities is already by itself the definition of surplus” [27]. Therefore, the peasant removed everything, even seed funds. In addition, the document did not set the amount of prodrazvyorstkas for one economic year.

As noted above, the state assumed the functions of distribution of food among the population. On the one hand, it corresponded to the “Program of the Communists (Bolsheviks)”: “Forward to the precise, systematic distribution of products by workers’ organizations, this should be the calling of conscious workers. For a more successful implementation of such a plan, it is needed to strive for the forced unification of the population in the consumer communes” [28]. On the other hand, by monopolizing the sphere of food distribution, the Bolsheviks achieved a complete dependence on them of the population. In this way the party achieved: 1. economic dictatorship; 2. political dictatorship; 3. control over the national economy, in particular over the forms of consumption; 4. the totalitarian nature of power in the state.

It would be a mistake to assert that such a system of distribution was arranged only by the party authorities. Equally, it arranged millions of workers who had a great opportunity to get rationed products at half price or free. The mutual interest of the masses and the authorities was an important factor in the introduction of “new” forms of distribution. For the exchange of industrial products for peasant production it was necessary to have the necessary stock of resources, obtained as a result of

carefully thought out and conducted a balanced fiscal policy. However, as history shows, it turned out to be bad for the Bolsheviks. Prodrazvyorstka as the main source of resource formation contributed to the decline of agriculture. The same resources that the state managed to accumulate were spent on the maintenance of the army, the Cheka, and the party workers.

Consequently, the replacement of the trade in state distribution was an attractive theory, which in practice was difficult or impossible to implement. In fact, in order to provide the population with food, the state resorted to the forced requisition of food from the peasants. Even the use of such coercive measures did not give the Bolshevik desired effect. The state did not succeed in meeting the minimum needs of the proletarian population in food.

Prior to the implementation of the prodrazvyorstka, strong farms were involved, in the second place - farms of average prosperity. It is so paradoxical for the authorities that protect the interests of the poor, but poor households were involved in the implementation of the prodrazvyorstka too. Although their participation was masked by the verbal curtain [29].

However, the bread in the countryside was not so much, as the Bolsheviks imagined. Not rare were cases when the product-units, arriving in the village, found that the landlord’s farmsteads, the rich peasants did not have bread. It was either taken away by the Hetman’s government in 1918, or sold to wealthy peasants before the Bolshevik offensive. The state of bread Katerynoslav’s “Izvestia” in 1919 was described as follows: “In the farmsteads and estates of the landlords there is almost no bread, the owners, taking into account the fragility of the Hetman and Petliurian authorities, at one time liquidated them. Sometimes the reserves left looted by the peasants or taken by military units. In many estates, there is no bread even for food for workers. With seed material the situation in the guberniya is catastrophic: there is no seed” [30]. From Bogodukhivsky and Lebedinsky districts of the Kharkiv guberniya received the same message: “The layout as a whole cannot be fulfilled, because most of the kulaks had their bread sold” [30]. Similar information came from other regions of the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, it was noted that the bread is among the poor and middle peasants. They also had the whole burden of implementing a prodrazvyorstka in the Ukrainian countryside.

A characteristic feature and a serious disadvantage of prodrazvyorstka for the peasantry was the conditionality of its progressive taxation. In practice, it was impossible to correlate the amount seized with the fact what really had the household. There were many reasons for that. One of them is that in order to survive, the peasants hid some of the food available on the farm. For the authorities, this gave additional grounds for accusing the “counterrevolution” of the middle-wealthy strata of the Ukrainian peasantry of the time, stirring up the flames of the peasant confrontation.

Negative from a prodrazvyorstka was also exacerbated by the fact that it did not exhaust the peasantry’s obligations to the state. For example, as in previous years, in the late 1919 and early 1920, peasants had to carry out additional labor duties. At the same



time, the Bolsheviks introduced general-civilian natural duties: labor, and guardsmen. They provided for the clearance of railways from snow, harvesting and transportation of firewood, foodstuffs obtained by *prodrazvyorstka*, etc. They aimed, as it were, to overcome the fuel and transport crises [31]. Sometimes the party, which subjected anathema to exploitation, used it to realize its own strategic goal – the construction of communism.

The policy of “war communism” in the Ukrainian countryside was implemented by the Soviet authorities on the ground. Particular role in this belonged to the committees of the poor. Combids were a kind of outpost of the Bolshevik Party in the countryside; their activity largely determined the capacity of Soviet power, the attitude of the peasantry to it, and so on. Their personnel contributed to the activity or inaction of the combids not only in solving the actual socio-economic needs of the peasants, but also in the implementation of the *prodrazvyorstka* and other components of the economic policy of Soviet power in the Ukrainian countryside.

Not the least role in the inactivity of combids was played by their personnel. In one of the reports from the seats to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, it was frankly said that in most cases they consisted of “upstarts, idlers and drunkards who had drunk their land because they did not want to process it”. In view of this, it is not surprising that it was more profitable to be poor in the countryside than to be wealthy, demanding from the authorities: “Let me eat, because I am poor” [32]. In Bila Tserkva in the Soviet institutions, according to one of the commissars, the majority consisted of servants who favored S. Petliura, and “the Cheka was a gang engaged in requisitions, drunkenness, beatings of prisoners” [33].

The shortage of personnel was felt in other bodies of Soviet power in the countryside. In particular, there was a pressing need for trained instructors, who would clearly understand the basic provisions of Bolshevism, and could explain them in accessible form to the peasants. For example, the report of the mobile-political commission said that the peasants have nobody to explain the essence of the cases, so they agree on any resolutions without understanding them, but they are confident that they will not be implemented in the near future [34].

The lack of workers and the relevant propaganda literature negatively affected both the attitude of the peasants to the representatives of the Soviet government and the solution pressing problems of peasant life by them [35]. Frequently there were cases when commissars in the village behaved like autocrat, forcibly imposing their authority. A typical situation in this regard was at the Vasilkiv Revolutionary Committee. Its managerial staff included godfathers, acquaintances, “own brothers”, settled down in a landlord’s house that was not looted, in which he organized the commune in the proper sense of this institution: “They got the cow, every day recaptured from the peasants 3-4 thousand eggs for solid prices for their needs. They brought two cooks, lived with a chanting. All of them were dressed in leather suits, boots, caps” [36].

The real situation in the countryside contrasted sharply with the pathos of speeches made by Soviet

leaders at congresses, conferences etc. Objectively, as shown by the analysis of that time sources, the Soviet authorities in the countryside were distanced from the peasant community. The situation fully corresponded to the well-known thesis of V. Lenin, however, in relation to another subject, “how far they are far from the people”. So, for example, in Podillia, the executive committees existed isolately, without any influence on the course of rural life [37]. In the Fastiv land, no work was done at all by the Soviet authorities [38].

No less numerous were the cases of abuse of official status by Soviet workers. In particular, in Pryluky, the chairman of the executive committee forced the social victim to give his father, allegedly suffered from the counter-revolution, 24 thousand rubles. According to the resolution of the same executive committee, its employees on Easter and the Trinity annually received alcoholic beverages, clothes for laundry, etc. In Bogodukhiv district in the Kharkiv region, the Communists simply robbed the confiscated monastic property [39].

A careful study of the source material makes it possible to state that the biggest disadvantage in the work of the Soviet apparatus on the ground was drunkenness. The abuse of alcohol by representatives of Soviet power on the ground negatively affected both the attitude of peasants towards them and the “people’s power” that they presented in the Ukrainian countryside. In Myrhorod, Poltava province, for this purpose, the heads of the executive committee, the land and housing department, the Cheka were removed. The latter, moreover, was also accused of excessive brutality against the peasants and their mass executions [40]. In Konotop, the commandant of the city in a drunken state shot the hotel manager. Verifying among the staff of the apparatus was recorded also massive drunkenness [41].

Such an active “revolutionary work” of the Soviet apparatus among the peasantry formed the between the last the relevant stereotypes of its perception, as well as the ideas propagated by it. Given this, the position of Soviet power in the Ukrainian countryside was uncertain. For the most part, the peasants treated it skeptically, with distrust: “It is worse than in times of tsar has become, we are not allowed to speak, the emergency police takes arrests often without clarifying the circumstances” [42]. In practice, the critical mass of peasant negativity in the attitude toward the Bolsheviks has steadily increased.

Some interest among the peasantry was caused by the communes. However, according to an analysis of the time sources, it was of a purely cognitive nature. For example, in Vasilkiv district, according to a report by the head of the five organizing committee on the construction of Soviet power, the peasants were questioned about the communes, but they were not in a hurry to organize them [43]. In the village of Mikhailivka in Chernigiv region, as in other regions of the republic, the peasantry was voted “for” the power of the councils in their understanding - without communes and communists [44]. In this context, A. Arosyev’s message, which he made on the basis of a real event, is interesting. In one of the villages, product organs distributed the skin to peasants. On the day after the peasants appealed to the local authorities to accept it back. They motivated their



request that “they do not want to join the commune, where they will be given half a pound of bread and not more” [45]. For such conclusions, the peasants had enough grounds.

However, the Bolsheviks to create communes were treated differently than peasants. According to D. Mykhailychenko’s observation, in March-April 1919 the most consistent attempt was made to introduce key milestones in the policy of “war communism” in Ukraine. In particular, in the defined chronological period, there is the creation of the largest number of communes and artels, the beginning of the activities of “food expeditions” in the South, and the activation of production units throughout the territory of the Ukrainian SSR [46]. This approach of the Bolsheviks to the creation of communes radically contradicts the attitude of the peasants to the communes. He only aggravated the peasant-Bolshevik confrontation.

Dissatisfaction, anger in the peasantry caused permanent requisitions that were purely predatory; they were carried out not only by the authorities, but also by the Red Army, the Chekists [47]. In 1919, in some districts of the republic, the peasants starved, in particular, in Gorodanka district. All this led to their hostile attitude to the “nationwide” power of the Soviets [48]. Such a negative attitude of the peasants to the ideas offered by the Bolsheviks was a reason for the anti-Soviet uprisings. The slogans of the rebels were as follows: “For Soviet rule, out of the Bolsheviks and Jews!” [49], “Down with the Commune!”, “Beat the Jews and the Communists!” [50]. In their minds, the Communist was synonymous with the Jew, and anti-Semitic sentiments were marked by radicalism. For example, in Sumy, peasants, taking part in the massacre over the communists, shouted: “Ah, you, the Jewish face!”. In Radomyśl and Fastiv, the peasants refused to take part in councils, explaining their reluctance to work with Jewish communists [51].

Thus, the dialogue between the Bolsheviks / Soviet government and the peasantry was based on the principles of “war communism”, “communist assault”, and “socialist front in the countryside”. It did not have a complimentary nature. The violence from the authorities regarding the peasantry dominated in it. The peasantry of Ukraine did not tolerate the policy of “war communism”. It corresponded to the reciprocity of such an attitude on the part of Soviet power - the peasant anti-Soviet resistance movement.

We share the opinion of domestic historians that 1919 was the time of radicalization of peasants’ dissatisfaction with the Soviet authorities, the transition of peasants to the active phase of anti-Soviet resistance, to armed forms and methods of struggle. In this sense, V. Masnenko’s judgment regarding the fact that in 1919 there was a peak in the development of a peasant anti-Soviet rebel movement is appropriate in this sense. The power and strength of the rebels is reasoned by the researcher, based on its mass and totality. At this time, M. Omeljanovich-Pavlenko drew more attention. The general wrote: “There was no village in Ukraine that did not have its own “headquarters”, somewhere in the secret beams or near the giant oak “Mazepa”, where the rebels had a gathering place. There was discharged the energy accumulated in the house, where the chieftains

instilled a mass of common opinion and will and waving the apparatus of struggle” [52].

According to D. Mykhailychenko, in April 1919 the situation in the Kyiv region, the Poltava region, and the Chernihiv region was the most menacing for Soviet power [46]. During the first two decades of July 1919, in Ukraine were registered 207 armed peasant uprisings against Soviet power. 111 of them took place in the Kyiv region, 37 - in Poltava, 20 - in Volyn, 14 - in the Kherson region, 12 in Chernihiv region and Podillya [53].

In our opinion, the geography and the number of peasant anti-Soviet armed demonstrations, slogans of the peasant struggle, unequivocally showed that the Ukrainian peasants did not accept the policy of “war communism,” an economic experiment of the Bolsheviks. They massively did not perceive Soviet power. Similar views were also expressed by the immediate participants in those events, in particular, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia - A. Denikin. Analyzing the reasons that forced the peasantry to turn away from the Bolsheviks, the general reasoned that the Soviet power was supposed to be the first. Reinforced in the summer of 1918 at the expense of the countryside, the Bolsheviks realized the danger that was encountered in two phenomena of peasant life: 1) the extraordinary growth of the owner’s institution, which threatened the peasantry’s withdrawal from the ideals of communism; 2) in stopping the exchange of goods between the city and the countryside, which inevitably led to the famine of the proletariat and the Red Guard - the only, though not entirely reliable, basis for its existence [54]. Therefore, with the first danger, which, according to Soviet figures, was embodied by the average peasantry - “kulaks”, the Bolsheviks fought by planting by force the committees of the poor. The activities of the latter, as we know, were so-called equalizing: economically strong farms were plundered, and their property, cattle, food stocks were distributed “evenly among the peasant’s poor” [55]. The second danger was eliminated by even more radical measures - with the help of armed product units, who went to the village for “surplus”.

A.P. Denikin called the food policy of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine predatory. “The Council of Commissioners”, he writes, “due to the complete failure of all measures taken by her and announced a food dictatorship shortly before coming to the Volunteers area due to a catastrophe” [54]. The peasantry reacted quickly and uncompromisingly: “Massacre with the Bolshevik authorities was extremely cruel” [54].

Thus, the peasant factor became the determining factor in the defeat of Soviet power in Ukraine in the summer of 1919. The peasantry opposed the communist assault imposed on it by the Bolsheviks during the implementation of the policy of “war communism”. Having lost the social base - the Ukrainian peasantry, the Bolsheviks got rid of political power in Ukraine.

#### THE INFLUENCE OF THE PEASANT FACTOR ON THE ESSENCE OF THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE POLICY OF “WAR COMMUNISM”

The peasant factor has become crucial in transforming the economic policy of the Bolsheviks in



the Ukrainian countryside with the restoration of Soviet power in Ukraine at the end of 1919. Bolshevik leaders, mindful of the end of the approval of their authorities in the spring of summer of 1919, changed the tactics of their struggle for the Ukrainian peasantry. In fact, after the victories over A. Denikin in 1919, the Soviet authorities were in a situation in which the Whites were before. They did not have enough forces to control the peasant element. At the same time, there was an urgent need for a stable rear for deploying successes at the front, which automatically raised the issue of the need for an agreement with the peasantry. In connection with this, there arose another problem: with which peasants to go to the union, albeit temporary. Thus, for example, T. Rysakov in a report on the state of affairs in the Ostroh Party organization proposed to conclude an agreement with the middle peasantry. In favor of his thesis, he put forward the following arguments: "... since he can become an ally of the kulaks, ... our rows are small, which also justifies the necessity of this agreement" [56].

However, there was no consensus on this issue among the highest party and state leadership. According to the materials of the VIII All-Russian Party Conference, a sharp discussion arose between V. Lenin and H. Rakovsky. Its content concerned the extent to which the agrarian policy of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine in the spring - in the summer of 1919 was correct and which it should be in the future under the new conditions. Why, at that time, the Soviet government had fierce armed resistance, thus protesting against the foundations of its economic policy. In this regard, H. Rakovsky acted as a lawyer of the previous Soviet economic policy. He argued that its unchanged can be implemented in the conditions that formed after the defeat of the Volunteer Army. V. Lenin adhered to the opposite view: "Regarding the speech by T. Rakovsky, I have to say that when he declared that Soviet farms should be the basis of our communist construction, which is not right. In no way can we put this case ... otherwise we will not have a block with the peasantry, but we need this block" [57]. S. Kulchitsky's thesis that the tactical tasks of establishing an alliance with the middle peasantry have become more priority than strategic, party affairs is quite right. According to the historian's rightful thought, the communist assault went back to the background of the concern for the preservation of power [58]. In our view, the reorientation of the Bolsheviks in relation to the peasantry in general and the middle peasants in particular was due to the fact that, under the conditions of the peasant nature of the Ukrainian revolution, the peasantry became an active subject of history. Its revolutionary nature has unequivocally demonstrated that its neglect is the reason for the defeat of any government that has tried to establish itself in Ukraine.

The Soviet leadership, under the influence of the peasantry, declared the main task of economic policy in the Ukrainian countryside to improve the economic well-being of the peasantry (the poor and the middle peasants) by increasing the size of its land security at the expense of the so-called unplanned land tenure. As party leaders of various ranks have repeatedly emphasized, all labor farms, without distinction of categories of the population and forms of land tenure, could freely use their land

without any restrictions [59]. According to the new circulars and orders of Soviet power, the middle peasants were involved in the implementation of the new agricultural legislation. In particular, they took part in the work of local land commissions [59].

The Bolsheviks, frantically saying that former Cossacks, peasant owners, state peasants, individual settlers, farmers will remain unchanged and continue to use their land parcels, in an attempt to extinguish the fire of the confrontations between the peasants and between the peasants and the Soviet power, which was blown up by their previous policy. The increase in the land plots of the few landless peasants will be carried out through the nationalization and distribution of the landed estates between these categories of peasants. A new mechanism for the realization of this extremely delicate and complicated case was proposed: new forms of land use will not be determined by state authorities, but by peasants who are much better informed about the local specifics of this issue [60].

Also, in front of the agitators, the Soviet authorities in the field, taking into account the transformation of the party's general line in economic policy, put forward fundamentally new tasks: to nationalize and distribute landlord land tenure on the basis of acceptable to the peasantry, to facilitate the transition of middle peasants to the side of Soviet power [60]. A careful analysis of the time documents convinces that the Bolsheviks, sharply turning their faces to the middle peasants, quickly forgot their slogans of the previous period in which middle peasants and kulaks were synonymous words. In connection with new moments in economic policy, the Soviet leaders have developed a new vision of middle peasants. According to its content, differentiated and opposed now to each other categories of peasantry, which were previously identified with the Bolshevik ideology. In particular, it is said that "not all individual settlers are the kulaks, among them, conditionally, there are many middle peasants" [61]. The Soviet leadership believed necessary, combining poor and middle peasants, to treat the latter with care [62]. An interesting and original condition was put forward that this association did not cause the middle peasants to associate with the Soviet authorities [63].

"We must," said one summary, "to conduct an agrarian policy in the countryside in such a way that the average citizen would feel that, through compromises, he would be able to recognize Soviet power as completely acceptable to him that he would choose a neutral position in our struggle against the kulaks" [64]. For this purpose, it was recommended that the middle peasant should not be picked up during the grain procurement, not requiring him to repair, use all the resources of the kulaks at first, and, with the average, establish a commodity exchange [65].

At the same time, comparing the situation in the Russian and Ukrainian countryside, the Soviet leaders have already distinguished between "two different worlds" for, at first glance, a certain similarity. Therefore, if the agrarian policy in the Russian countryside was proclaimed a "bet on the middle peasant", then in Ukrainian the "organization of the poor and the neutralization of the middle peasant" [66].



The purpose of the Bolshevik economic policy also was changed, at least its official formulation. In the marked chronological period, Soviet leaders proclaimed that their goal was to improve the material well-being of the poor and middle peasants by increasing their land use at the expense of so-called nonworking farms and improvement of management [67]. The stated purpose was to achieve the following tasks: 1) the expansion of social and public cultivation of land; 2) supply of peasants with seed funds; 3) provision of peasant farms with a tax and equipment; 4) saturation of peasant households with “agricultural machines” [68]. If, on the eve of the offensive of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks gave the sovkhozes and communes the advantage of providing equipment, machines, and seedlings, then under the new circumstances the priority belonged to the peasant farms of the poor and the middle peasants. It is clear that at that time, the complex socio-economic and socio-political conditions of the revolution did not have the necessary means to implement the above-mentioned tasks from the Bolsheviks. In view of this, the Soviet authorities in the field were obliged to implement them through redistribution. From them, the central authorities demanded the transfer of live and dead inventory so-called. Unemployed households are primarily at the disposal of the poor and middle peasants, and only then - exemplary farms [69]. In addition, the state took over the costs of repairing agricultural machinery, harvesting sown seeds, controlling the sowing campaign, requiring maximum sowing of areas [70].

Thus, at the end of 1919, under the influence of the Ukrainian peasantry, of its revolutionary character and of the anti-Soviet resistance movement, the Bolsheviks substantially revised certain principles of the policy of “war communism”. First, they began to clearly distinguish the Ukrainian peasantry from Russia. Secondly, they refused to interpret the middle-class peasantry as a class enemy, choosing the tactic of a deal with him. Thirdly, the state took over the solution of a part of the socio-economic problems of the peasantry in relation to the seed fund, repair of equipment and repairs, and so on. Fourth, under the influence of the peasant factor, the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1920 adopted the land law. As J. Malyk [30] rightly observes, this document was a deliberate tactical step by the Soviet authorities towards the Ukrainian peasantry. In particular, H. Rakovsky, explaining to the delegates of the Fourth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in May 1920 the purpose of his adoption, did not conceal that this was done in order to “rip out in the counter-revolution one of the means of campaigning against us” [71].

#### THE ROLE OF THE PEASANT FACTOR IN THE REFUSAL OF THE BOLSHEVIKS FROM THE POLICY OF “WAR COMMUNISM” AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

Yet the main question for Soviet power in Ukraine at the end of 1919 - 1920 was the question of the peasantry, the search for an economic alliance with him. The review of the individual fundamentals of the policy of “war communism” did not concern the essence of this policy. The basic principle - the displacement of commodity-

money relations from the economy in general and agriculture in particular - remained intact. First of all, it concerned the food sector, a monopoly in which the ruling party took over. Accordingly, the Soviet food policy continued to be implemented on an old basis. The latter was frankly consumer and aggressive. The Ukrainian countryside was dissatisfied with the requisition of food, the prohibition of trade after the elimination of the fronts. The peasant masses did not tolerate the policy of “war communism” and as a form of its implementation in the village - by *prodrazvyorstka*. Despite the obvious miscalculations in the food sector, the supply of the city with agricultural products, the central leadership since the second half of 1920 increased pressure on the free market. On July 15, 1920, the RSFSR CPC issues a decree “On settlement operations”, and soon it came into force in Ukraine. It proclaimed that all state, public institutions, enterprises, organizations in need of anything are obliged to apply to the relevant distribution organizations. Buying in a free market is prohibited. Settlements could be made only in non-cash form [72]. In this way, the original purpose of the Bolsheviks was achieved: the state economy was separated from market economic relations.

Tax pressure on peasant farms gradually, and sometimes rapidly expanding. In the 1920-1921 economic year, tax pressures accounted for 25.1% of contingent income [73]. Lenin pointed out: “The settlement in the village prevented the rise of production forces and became the main cause of the deep economic and political crisis that we faced in the spring of 1921” [74]. Consequently, the state’s economic policy towards the peasantry continued to have a clearly expressed consumer character. The peasant lost interest in managing, reducing the crop area. An interesting parallel: in the areas of active implementation of the supermarket, the largest reduction in the area under cultivation occurred. First of all, it concerns the Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Poltava guberniyas. “The peasant was not only poor, but also did not want to be rich” [75]. Pumping the bread from the countryside to the cities, while simultaneously reducing the industrial production, exacerbated the unequal exchange between the city and the countryside. The state of agriculture of Ukraine was extremely negatively affected by the 1920 *prodrazvyorstka*. According to many researchers, in particular S.V. Kulchytsky, P.P. Panchenko, N. Vert, it became a catalyst for the post-war crisis in the agricultural sector. In view of the increase in requisites in agriculture in 1920, the number of cattle, pigs, and sheep dropped sharply. However, the Bolsheviks continued to export food from Ukraine to the industrial centers of Russia. The harvested produce was extremely difficult to supply to the inhabitants of cities. The fact is that the transport did not cope with the traffic. The reasons for this were diverse: 1. lack of fuel; 2. damage to railways; 3. repair of locomotives, etc. In 1920 the cargo turnover of transport was 23% of the level of 1913.

The catastrophic state of the economy led to dissatisfaction with the Bolshevik policy that resulted in strikes of industrial workers, peasant uprisings, which in the 1920s and early 1921 captured Ukraine. The Soviet government lost its support even among the poorest strata of the Ukrainian countryside. The territory of



Soviet Ukraine was littered with the bonfires of anti-Bolshevik peasant armed rebellions [76]. In our opinion, there was a paradoxical and tragic situation. At this time, Soviet power in Ukraine fought for the people's power with its own people. The Soviet leadership stubbornly ignored the obvious things. It's about the fact that agriculture is the economy of small owners, small producers, which is connected with the market by an infinite number of connections. In view of this, having declared war on the market, the Bolsheviks began it primarily with the countryside, the main source of productive revenues to the state.

The economic short-sightedness of the Bolshevik leaders led to another wave of armed peasant anti-Soviet confrontation. The peasant anti-Soviet armed resistance movement did not stop in the 1920 - early 1921. Objectively, the current situation in the republic with the completion of large-scale military operations illustrates documents that have long been inaccessible to researchers.

Thus, for example, a special department of the Southwest Front, making a brief review of the situation in Ukraine in June 1920, reported: "Ukraine is facing another wave of uprisings. The uprisings in the Kharkiv, Donetsk and Chernihiv guberniyas are carried over from the neighboring Kursk, Yekaterinoslav and Kyiv guberniyas, where the uprising is well-organized. Cradle revolt is the Kiev and Ekaterinoslav guberniyas. These outbreaks have grounds for the false actions of the ramps" [77].

The secret department of the Cheka deputies informed in its informational constitution June 16-30, 1920: "Kharkiv guberniya. In Akhtyrka district, in connection with the decisive means for the pumping of bread, the mood of the peasantry has changed for the worse. The party is weak and the peasantry has little or no understanding of the tasks of Soviet power" [78].

V. Antonov-Ovsienko reported: "At the beginning of June, the mood of the peasants of Katerynoslavia in general and in general was not in the interests of Soviet power. According to the June data, 226 districts (total in the guberniya of 278 volosts) were: covered by the uprising - 6, hit by ... banditry - 64, hostile, but not active - 91, loyal and kulak - 63, openly Soviet - 3. The transition of the poor in the gang should be considered, firstly, as a reflection of the spontaneous process of stratification of the countryside, and secondly, as an error that consists in the fact that we did not take into account the moment and did not provide the poor with the appropriate form of organization. As for the middle peasant, it can be a great material for use under conditions if we: 1) are interested in robbery of a fist; 2) We really will carry out our policy of translation of the main burden on the kulaks" [79].

Ekaterinoslav gubcheka, reporting on its activities from 15 July to 1 August 1920, informed: "Among farmers planned to strengthen hostility to Soviet power, in connection with the use repressive means to implement the surplus. There are cases of dissolution of councils and appointment of elders in their place as a result of a number of surplus repression performance progressed but banditry is still considerable dimensions, including

its impact those strata of the peasantry, who were passive" [80].

From the information summary for August 1-15, 1920: "Kyiv guberniya. The mood of the population is good and cheerful. In the counties that were not occupied by the Polish-Petliurian troops, the mood of the Petliurian peasants and the kulaks set the peasants against the Soviet authorities. Poltava guberniya. The attitude of the peasantry towards the Communist Party is hostile. Kherson guberniya. The mood of the population of the Aleksander district is Petlyurian. Residents hide weapons, even machine guns. The uprising can be expected" [81].

From a two-week information summary of the secret department of the Cheka for September 15-30, 1920: "Katerynoslav guberniya. The province is an unfavorable ground for Soviet construction. The mood of all sectors of the population is unsatisfactory. The peasantry is set up hostile. Podillya guberniya. In the Vinnytsia district, the Pikiv and Lupinka volosts completely refused to perform the overdraft. The situation has become so threatening that the pro-workers refused to work without the support of the detachment. Donetsk guberniya. The peasantry has absolutely no idea of the Soviet power and the Communist Party" [82].

The secret department of the Cheka, analyzing the situation in the regions subject to the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, testified: "Kherson, Nikolaev guberniyas. Soviet institutions are poisoned by anti-Semitism. Uprodcms are completely idle, even the working population and working county cities obtain absolutely nothing for cards. On a free market bread costs 300 rubles. In volost and village councils there are open-minded counterrevolutionaries, there is no one to replace them. There is a flurry, lack of discipline in Soviet institutions" [83].

The report a secret department of Cheka of the insurgency as of November 1920 contains the following information: "Recent experience of war with Vrangl proved that Ukrainian kulaks and all peasantry allegedly remained loyal, but it does not mean that prosperous element of peasantry smoothly joined the Soviet power. A peasant - a rich man, is afraid of the stick of a landowner, a whip of a policeman and a heavy tribute to the governor, but he is also afraid of the proletarian sequence in the construction of communism. The Ukrainian kulaks want to become the "owners" of the village itself, not to depend on the city and the worker. During the three years of the revolution, so much power has prevailed in Ukraine, that "powerlessness" seems to Ukrainian "bread maker" somehow "ideal" curable from all evil [84].

Gradually, by the spring of 1921, the negative attitude of the peasantry towards a prodrazvyorstka was realized completely. It was simply impossible not to see this happen. A. Tsyurupa reported in connection with this: "Around the demoralization, disorganization and extermination of our apparatus. Only at the Ukrainian food front killed 1,700 purchasers" [85]. We pay tribute to the Bolshevik leader, his ability to objectively assess reality. V. Lenin stated: "The peasantry is dissatisfied by the form of relations that we have formed, it does not want this form of relations, and it will not continue to



exist. This is indisputable. This will expressed unambiguously. This is the will of the social masses of the working people” [85].

The peak of the crisis was March 1921. The country was shocked by the news of the rebellion in Kronstadt. It was raised by sailors, most of whom were peasants, dissatisfied with the policy of “war communism”. The Bolsheviks faced a real threat of losing power. “The economy of spring 1921 turned into politics: “Kronstadt” [86]. Under the pressure of the anti-Bolshevik position of the peasantry on February 4, 1921, in a speech at the Moscow Metalworkers Conference, V. Lenin put forward a general party task - to reconsider the relations of the workers and peasants. In this regard, he wrote that it is necessary to satisfy the peasantry’s desire to replace the surplus (as the extraction of surpluses) by the grain tax [87]. Thus, in the early 1920s, the dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian peasantry by the Soviet authorities, as evidenced by the mass and scale of peasant performances in Ukraine during this period, in fact forced the state party leadership to revise the economic theory and practice of Marxism. Without the introduction of the NEP, the Bolsheviks would not be able to hold power in their hands. In this regard, they under the pressure of the peasantry opened the door to commodity-money relations, economic incentives for production, primarily in agriculture. The rejection of the policy of “war communism” meant a revival of the market economy, mainly for peasants.

**The conclusions.** Thus, the Bolsheviks, for their doctrinal principles, used the idea of peasant inferiority, taking it on their arsenal. They were captured by class-revolutionary utopias. They developed the concept of peasantry as an ally of the proletariat in the struggle for a bright future. However, the proletariat, which supposedly had nothing to lose except its own chains, was proclaimed the hegemon. The peasant, in accordance with Marxist interpretation, was regarded as a subject with “dual psychology”. “Culturally, politically” the peasantry, on the conviction of the Bolshevik leaders, was different from the proletariat, more backward, more archaic. It was on the path to a bright future, modeled by Marxist-Leninist, who needed a guide in the face of the Bolshevik Party and the proletariat as an ally “on the road to communism”.

The leadership of the RCP (b), as noted by the Ukrainian Communists, in its understanding of Ukrainian realities proceeded from two points: the theoretical system of Bolshevism and Russian reality. Therefore, for them, the Ukrainian SSR seemed economically backward region, frankly kulak. Such views of the Bolsheviks were presented and embodied in the economic policy of the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian countryside. The policy of “war communism” - the policy of “communist assault”, “socialist front in the countryside”, curtailment of commodity-money relations in the economy as a whole, and in agriculture in particular. However, agriculture is the economy of small owners, small producers, which is connected with the market by an infinite number of links. Not surprisingly, having declared war on the market, the Bolsheviks began it first with the peasantry – the main source of productive

revenues to the state, an active subject of the Ukrainian Revolution.

The peasantry of Ukraine did not tolerate the policy of “war communism”. It corresponded to the reciprocity of such an attitude on the part of Soviet power - the peasant anti-Soviet resistance movement. The result of the peasant-Bolshevik confrontation was the loss of power by the Bolsheviks in Ukraine in the summer of 1919. This course of events was an impetus for the revision by the leadership of the RCP (b) of the doctrinal principles of the policy of “war communism”. First of all, the attitude towards Soviet power towards the middle peasantry, which was the majority in the then-time structure of the Ukrainian peasantry of the time, was revised. The Soviet leadership, in an attempt to extinguish the blown up by their own flame policy among peasant confrontations, frankly said that former Cossacks, peasant owners, state peasants, cuttings, farmers would remain unchanged and continue to use their land holdings. The increase in the land plots of the few landless peasants will be carried out through the nationalization and distribution of these categories of peasants in the landed estates. The proposed mechanism for the implementation of this extremely delicate and complicated case was proposed: new forms of land use will not be determined by state authorities, but by the peasants themselves who are much better aware of the local specifics of this problem.

The purpose of the agrarian policy of the Bolsheviks was changed, at least its official formulation. In the marked chronological period, Soviet leaders declared that their goal was to improve the material well-being of the poor and middle peasants by increasing their land use at the expense of the so-called nonworking farmsteads and improvement of management.

However, during the late 1919 and 1920, the Bolsheviks did not change anything in food policy in the Ukrainian countryside. The latter was frankly predatory nature. Its consequences were negative for Soviet power. It lost its support even among the poorest strata of the Ukrainian countryside. The territory of Soviet Ukraine was littered with the hearths of anti-Bolshevik peasant armed uprisings.

Under the influence of the revolutionary activity of the peasantry, taking into account the previous experience of the loss of power, in the spring of 1921 the Bolsheviks abandoned the policy of “war communism”. In Soviet Ukraine, a new economic policy was introduced based on market mechanisms of regulation of the economy. The resumption of commodity-money relations in the countryside corresponded to the sentiments of the Ukrainian peasantry – an active subject of that time history.

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### ВПЛИВ СЕЛЯНСЬКОГО ФАКТОРА НА ЕКОНОМІЧНУ ПОЛІТИКУ БІЛЬШОВИКІВ В УКРАЇНСЬКОМУ СЕЛІ (1919 – 1921 РР.)

**Постановка проблеми.** Початок ХХ ст. в історії українського націотворення позначений кардинальними зрушеннями, зумовленими Українською революцією 1917 – 1921 рр. Одним із доказів того, що Українська революція 1917 – 1921 рр. носила селянський характер є те, що саме від того, в який спосіб та чи інша влада вирішить аграрне питання, залежало її політичне майбуття. Характер взаємин селянства з будь-якою владою багато в чому визначав конструктивну чи деструктивну спрямованість суспільно-політичної активності селянства, яка, поряд із перебігом подій на фронтах, у кінцевому результаті й визначила фінал Української революції. Фактично невдачі та поразки Центральної Ради, Гетьманату, Директорії УНР, Збройних сил Півдня Росії, радянської влади значною мірою були зумовлені селянським фактором.

**Мета статті** полягає у тому, щоб дослідити вплив селянського фактора на еволюцію економічної політики більшовиків в українському селі впродовж 1919-1921 рр.

**Основні результати дослідження.** У результаті проведеного дослідження обґрунтовано те, що революційна активність селянства зумовила перегляд більшовиками доктринальних засад

політики «військового комунізму», а згодом відмову від політики «військового комунізму», запровадження непу. Політика «військового комунізму» - політика «комуністичного штурму», «соціалістичного фронту на селі», згорання товарно-грошових відносин.

**Висновки.** Оголосивши війну ринку, більшовики розпочали її насамперед з селянством – основним джерелом продуктивних надходжень до держави, активним суб'єктом Української революції. Селянство на таке ставлення до себе з боку радянської влади відповідало антирадянським рухом опору. Результатом селянсько-більшовицького протистояння стала втрата більшовиками влади влітку 1919 р. Такий перебіг подій став поштовхом до перегляду керівництвом РКП(б) доктринальних засад політики «військового комунізму». Однак упродовж кінця 1919 – 1920 рр. більшовики нічого не змінили у продовольчій політиці в українському селі. Радянська влада втратила прихильність навіть серед найбільш бідних прошарків українського села. Територія Радянської України була всяяна вогнищами антибільшовицьких селянських збройних повстань. Під впливом революційної активності селянства навесні 1921 р. у Радянській Україні було запроваджено нову економічну політику. Відновлення товарно-грошових відносин на селі відповідало настроям українського селянства – активного суб'єкта тогочасної історії.

**Ключові слова:** економічна політика більшовиків, політика «військового комунізму», нова економічна політика, українське селянство, Українська революція.

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### БАЗАРНА ТОРГІВЛЯ ЯК СКЛАДОВА МАТЕРІАЛЬНО-ЕКОНОМІЧНОГО ФУНКЦІОНУВАННЯ СЕЛЯНСЬКОГО ДВОРУ В РОКИ «ВІДЛИГИ»

Висвітлено значення базарної торгівлі як важливого джерела доходів, які отримували українські селяни від реалізації продукції, вирошеної в особистому присадибному господарстві. На основі залучених матеріалів польових досліджень проаналізовано шляхи і способи реалізації продукції посередництвом базарної торгівлі. Охарактеризовано чинники, що визначили активність селян у базарній торгівлі. Доведено, що особиста підприємливість селянства сприяла покращенню матеріально-побутового забезпечення селянських родин.

**Ключові слова:** «відлига», колгоспне селянство, особисте присадибне господарство, селянський двір, матеріальний добробут, базарна торгівля.