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M. Hlibischuk

THE CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION T. SKOCPOL

Introduction. The problematics of the phenomenon of revolutions in world history is still interesting not only for Western, but also for Ukrainian researchers. After all, each new generation of scientists is trying to rethink the role of this phenomenon and criticize the past theoretical concepts.

Purpose. The concept of revolution of the famous American researcher Theda Skocpol has been analyzed in the article. The author briefly described the key provisions of Theda Skocpol's theoretical concept.

Results. A great deal of attention is devoted to T. Skocpol's key ideas about the division of all revolutions into two types. The first ones are social revolutions. Social revolutions are rapid, fundamental transformations of state and class structures of society. They are accompanied and partially carried out by the uprisings from below on a class basis. The uniqueness of such events is that large-scale social and political transformations take place simultaneously, mutually reinforcing each other. These changes are due to intensive socio-political conflicts, the main role in which is played by the confrontation of different social strata. Political revolutions change only state structures, and the social structure of society remains constant. Moreover, they are not necessarily implemented through class struggle.

Originality and Conclusion. A considerable attention was devoted to the role of various social groups in the revolutionary process. Critical judgments on T. Skocpol's scientific approach have also been given.

Key words: Theda Skocpol, revolution, conception, structural approach.

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POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY: INSIGHT FROM THE NORDIC HISTORIOGRAPHY ON THE UKRAINIAN FAMINE IN 1932-33*

*The article analyses the intellectual origins of integrating the study of memory within the humanities. The author highlights the intertextuality** (de Saussure [12], J. Kristeva [29]) and socially embedded character (J. Olick, R. Joyce, D. Levy [36]) of memory studies. Inspired by a theory of securitization (B. Buzan, O. Wævel, J. de Wilde [7] and other scholars from Copenhagen school), a somewhat new term of "genocidation"*

* The drafts of this paper were presented at the ReNEW workshop "Politics of memory: Nordic experiences of dealing with historical legacies", March 27th, 2019 at Copenhagen Business School and during the 8th Baryshnikov history days in Vyborg, September 29th, 2018.

** *Intertextuality* is an interdisciplinary term borrowed from modern linguistics and literary theory that acknowledges the fundamental interdependence of texts, emphasizing that new texts draw their substantial meaning from previous texts.

is introduced by the author in order to describe a re-invention of the Ukrainian post-Soviet identity narrative. Apart from theoretical approaches to interdisciplinary studies of memory politics in the post-globalized world, the article presents an attempt to investigate the presence of the Ukrainian famine in Nordic historiography, pointing at the existing gap in academic research on this topic in the Nordic countries. A suggestion for further research is being made, conditioned upon the access to Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish archives. The article is a part of the joint project on the Soviet famine, carried out with the support from the ReNEW Excellency Hub of research at Copenhagen Business School and Bańska Bystrica University, Slovakia.

Key words: Collective memory, lieux de mémoire, genocidation, Holodomor, Ukraine, genocide, Soviet famine, Nordic historiography.

The statement of the issue. On April 28, 2010 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution, encouraging historians of countries of the former Soviet Union which suffered during the Great Famine, as well as historians from other countries, to conduct joint independent research programmes in order to establish the full, unbiased and unpoliticised truth about this human tragedy, and to make it public [9]. The Ukrainian famine is one of the most well-studied subjects in the world historiography, with more than 20,000 publications devoted to the study of Holodomor [30]. While an increasing number of archives has become open to public in post-Soviet countries as well as abroad, there is still a significant potential for research with regards to Nordic historiography of the Soviet famine to be included in the international scholarship.

Theoretical context of research. The study of memory politics lies at the intersection of several disciplines: sociology, history, political science as well as organization studies.

The sociological mechanisms of collective memory were formulated by Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945), a French philosopher and sociologist [22].

Historians of the third generation of the Annales School, associated with cultural history, history of representations and *histoire des mentalités*, coined the term *nouvelle histoire*, or new history [31]. Pierre Nora in his article “Between Memory and History” (1989) drew a line between *lieux de mémoire* and *lieux d’histoire*, arguing that sociology of memory maybe construed as an attempt to come to terms with the need to study situations marked by “*a will to remember*”, without which the distinction between the space of memory (*lieux de mémoire*) and the space of history (*lieux d’histoire*) becomes indiscernible [35].

Historical approaches have also been flourishing in management and organisation research in recent years, focusing particularly on the ‘uses of the past’ approach, or approach of historical consciousness. Organisational historians apply a *historical consciousness approach*, which takes history as constitutive in shaping how actors define their own sense of self and action in time, how they produce and use history in broader processes of epistemological and ontological “knowing” in organisations and organising [48, 1664].

A Danish business historian P. Hansen in his article provides examples of how historical narratives shape both remembering and forgetting through framing the way we view the past [21, 700]. In other words, what

does not get told, might as well not exist. At the same time, strong narratives are not easily forgotten. In this regard, P. Hansen refers to sociolinguist Charlotte Linde, who asserts that a flipside of memory loss is an equal and opposite fear that memory reproduces practices that were better forgotten and that too much memory is as much of a problem as too much forgetting [ibid].

The very metaphor of history as a teacher of life has become an example of selective memory and forgetting: in the original citation from Cicero’s *De Oratore*, enlisting the various tasks of history, *magistra vitae* was preceded by *vitae memoriae* - a “*life of memory*”:

“*Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritas, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis qua voce alia nisi oratoris immortalitati commendatur?*”

In E.W. Sulton’s translation, however, *vitae memoriae* and *magistra vitae* are ruled with the same verb:

“*And as History, which bears witness to passing of the ages, sheds light upon reality, gives life to recollection and guidance to human existence, and brings tidings of ancient days, whose voice, but the orator’s can entrust her to immortality?*” [8, 224–225].

Rankean philosophy regards the purpose of history in not judging the past for the benefit of future generations, but merely showing the past as it once was” [48, p. 1665]. However, the creation of historical memory is rarely a simple attempt to formulate a “truthful” reconstruction of the past; it is usually about creating a specific vision of it for instrumental reasons, or, in other words, the purposive use of selective remembering and forgetting [6, 8].

History is also one of the most powerful forces in organisations, because, as evidenced by organizational theorist Karl Weick, over time organizations develop a trained incapacity to see the world differently, which is explained by Douglass North’s notion that formal and informal institutions are path dependent and constrain our choice set (in more detail please see P. Hansen “Business History: A cultural and narrative approach” [21, 700]).

Political science, in its turn, focuses rather on strategies that political actors employ to make others remember in certain, specific ways (and the effects of such mnemonic manipulations). For political scientists, historical memory is approached as a product of power struggles between advocates of instrumental persistence and instrumental change in the public presentation of the past [6, 10].

The **goal** of this article is to outline a theoretical as well as an empirical framework for future analysis of the Nordic historiography of the Soviet famine of the 1930s.

The statement of the basic material.

“**Genocidation**” of the Ukrainian famine. In his 1986 Jefferson Lecture, a Polish philosopher and historian of ideas Leszek Koźakowski asserted that we learn history not in order to know how to behave or how to succeed, but to know who we are. “*What is a nation? It is a collective memory, which in one way or another extends to all of us, via school, but also through a variety of common traditions - monuments, songs, anthems, music, and literature. All of this makes us a single nation. Thanks to everything that is memory we live as a distinct*



whole. That is the reason why ideological conflicts often play out through manipulation of memory. Each nation, every European nation, has in its history rather inglorious pages. We try to minimise these events somehow, even forget about them, by various acts of manipulation" (Leszek Kołakowski 1986 Jefferson Lecture).

Although the Cold War continues to shape and define national identities and international relations, yet it has received relatively little scholarly attention in the field of memory studies, with the exception of Central and Eastern European countries, where 'the Soviet occupation' has been treated more extensively, for example in the Baltic countries, as a collective memory emphasising *a discourse of victimhood*. [17, 471-472]. In the words of the Bulgarian scholar Tzvetan Todorov, a nation that conceptualizes itself as a victim of genocide "obtains a bottomless line of moral credit. The greater the crime in the past, the more compelling the rights in the present – which are gained merely through membership in the wronged group," thereby again enabling the "wronged group" to externalize its responsibility [47]. A. Applebaum explains that the Ukrainian famine and its legacy play an enormous role in contemporary Russian and Ukrainian arguments about their identity, their relationship and their shared Soviet experience [2]. The historical genocide discourse in Ukraine is one of the most recent and prominent examples of communism victimhood framing, directed at morally and internationally cementing Ukraine's claim to independent statehood [14, 564].

The term "**genocide**" (from Greek *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *-cidere* (to kill)) was coined by R. Lemkin and adopted by the international community to give a name to a crime perpetrated by Nazi Germany [14, 555]. Lemkin studied law at the University of Lviv and worked as a lecturer in comparative law at the Free University of Poland. In 1933, he was invited to give a special report at the 5th Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid, where he for the first time proposed the creation of a multilateral convention, recognizing the extermination of human groups an international crime [50]. After World War II, the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution declaring genocide a crime under international law in December 1946, reflecting Lemkin's broad definition of genocide as "the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group" [14, 554]; however, the Soviet Union preferred a more narrow definition, which was adopted in the final Convention passed in 1948 [46]. It came into force in 1951 and legally defined genocide as an act intent on destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such [ibid.]. The advocates of recognizing Holodomor as genocide often refer to Lemkin's article from 1953, where he expressed his opinion of Soviet famines as acts of genocide aimed at destruction not only of individuals, but also of cultures and nations [34, 29; 50]. A. Applebaum, who presented a translation of her book "Red Famine" in Copenhagen last year [1], also believes that based on Lemkin's broader understanding of the term as an intentional process aimed at annihilating a national group, the famine would have been constituted genocide.

Holodomor (a Ukrainian equivalent of Gorta Mór – killing by privation & starvation) has not only been at the centre of political and cultural debate but has become

an integral part of state- and national reconstruction in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Some scholars believe that genocide gained rhetorical currency after the break-up of the Soviet Union [144, 555]. Reflecting the time lag between Ukrainian and Western intellectual currents, Ukrainians began debating the Holodomor-as-genocide thesis just as Western scholars were moving to accept it [34, 29]. Since the end of communism, all the countries of the former Soviet bloc have been in need of positive national narratives in order to reconstruct themselves as nation-states; they needed something to "look back to" and "to go on," a history which is meant to give meaning, identity and cohesion to their respective social collectives. [14, 549]. Identity is known to come laden with history and memory, where a sense of the past and its injustices are inseparable from a set of moral sensibilities.

Therefore, the "re-discovery" of the 1932-33 famine has played a crucial role in the Ukrainian political life, reflected in the confrontation between those advocating the break with the USSR (and later Russia) and others who preferred to maintain close ties with the powerful Eastern neighbour. Eventually, in 2006 the Ukrainian parliament officially recognized the 1932-33 famine as a genocide perpetrated by Stalin's regime against the Ukrainian people.

In terms of international law, however, there is no unanimous approach towards using the term "genocide" in relation to Holodomor [14, 557]. Today, both the UN and the EU consider Holodomor not as genocide, but as a crime against humanity [16; 46]. However, even if Holodomor had been officially recognised by the UN as a genocide, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 does not have a reverse power in time and cannot officially impose any sanctions because of crimes committed before its ratification. Therefore the recognition of Holodomor as genocide cannot lead to reparations or any other form of economic or political compensations to Ukrainians from the judicial point of view.

Yet, as it is mentioned in the preamble of the Convention, "at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity" [46]. That officially means that the recognition of those genocides committed prior to 1948, though not leading to direct effects on contemporary international politics, bear significance in terms of memory and historical justice.

During the Cold War, a proliferation of the term "genocide" eventually took place, as both the USSR and the US were accusing each other of "genocide" within their respective spheres of hegemony. The "genocide wars" have not ceased after the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the contrary, they only intensified the struggle for national identity. In 1983, historian E. Hobsbawm employed the term "proliferation of history", describing the state-led efforts of German nation-building in the nineteenth century consistent of "inventing" useful traditions and 'irrational' elements in the maintenance of the social fabric and the social order" [37, 117]. In a similar way, genocide has already become overused in various contexts and has lost some of its original meaning, which permits a discussion of the present proliferation of the term.

The post-Soviet states, setting out to re-invent their national historical, linguistic and cultural narratives, also

began their “genocide wars.” [14, 555]. With this in mind, by extending the securitisation approach, proposed by the Copenhagen School, to the study of Holodomor, I put forward a framework of *genocidation* to be introduced, understood as discursive instrument of power in the terminology of Michel Foucault [19, 133-134]. This discursive approach suggests that the reality acquires a certain meaning through representation. Political actors are struggling for the possession of the right to determine the scope of interpretation and to extrapolate their impact on the socio-political relations. The quest for recognition of specific national calamities as “genocides” has been described by Evgeny Finkel as the “search for lost genocides” and as a phenomenon of newly-born states with little or no history of independence to use the status of “genocide victim” as an “efficient mechanism to brush aside demands to confront injustices and crimes committed by members of the ‘suffering nation’” [18]. The proposed framework of “genocidation” implies understanding of the political effects of conscious or unconscious operationalization of the term in post-Soviet state-building and identity processes and thus can be broadly applied to analysing the genocide narratives of any of the former Soviet states (i.e. see the Russian president D. Medvedev accusing Georgia of genocide in South Ossetia in August–September 2008 [27, 6], and other cases).

Nordic historiography of the Soviet famine. The historicity of the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 is no longer challenged; what is disputed is the number of victims, the reasons for the calamity and its nature [50]. Although Western democracies were aware of the mass starvations of the Soviet people in 1932-34, it was not until 1986, when Robert Conquest’s “The Harvest of Sorrow” was published, for a real breakthrough in the studies of Holodomor to take place [10].

Initially, most of the Danish and Swedish historians argued that the famine was a tragedy for the whole Soviet peasantry, and that it was the result of the implementation of the Stalinist model of forced industrialisation, which entailed forced collectivisation with its forced collection of agricultural products, especially of grain. Collections were aimed at increasing grain exports and satisfying the needs of the growing industry. In 1934, a book “Onkel, giv os brød” (“Uncle, give us bread”) [43] was published by a Danish journalist Arne Strøm, who witnessed the famine when he travelled across the USSR, and made one of the few attempts at that time to present a more genuine picture of the situation back in Denmark. The book was also translated into English, and was read by W. Churchill.

However, many of the Westerners visiting the USSR, did not envisage any famine in Ukraine due to the successful efforts of Stalin’s diplomats. There is evidence from one of the workers from Odessa would give his account of the visit by the French Prime Minister, Édouard Herriot on 26 August 1933: “Today, Herriot arrived in Odessa. Our authorities are scared and want to pull the wool over the foreigners’ eyes, that – he says – we have socialism. I saw a militia officer run into the greengrocer’s and give a stupid command to immediately get rid of a line of people standing in front of the shop. It is clear that Herriot does not know what is happening here” (document no. 138) [23, 46]. (For more documented examples, please refer to “Holodomor. The Great Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933. Poland and Ukraine in the 1930’s–

1940’s. Unknown Documents from the Archives of the Secret Services, 2009” [23]).

Some valuable insights regarding the interpretation of history on the official level in the Nordic countries can be derived from history textbooks of that time [32; 41]. In Swedish textbook “General history for the secondary school” [5] the Soviet peasants are portrayed as intractable opponents of the rationalisation of the agricultural sector, and therefore, in many cases, deported to Siberia [5; cit. from 41, 511].

Danish history books also presented a rather controversial picture of Soviet state from time to time. For instance, Lenin was often described as a basically legitimate leader, with no personal lust for power. The depiction of the civil war shows much greater sympathy for the Red side, which with “*irrepressible energy*” “*managed to repel every attack*” and “*to consolidate and rebuild Russia*” [cit. from 41, 515]. A positive image of Lenin is also portrayed in Erik Lund’s “The last 60 years”, where Lenin is called “a charming and efficient” leader; and red troops depicted as liberators. E. Lund also presents Stalin as “very influential” rather than explicitly as a dictator, and the repressions of his era are explained by the necessity to fight illiteracy. In the description of collectivization, it is stated that it was “*stubbornness of affluent Kulaks that forced the government to introduce brutal governing rules*” (for this and a more comprehensive account of the Danish and Swedish history textbooks in the Cold War period please see J. Stenfeldt (2012) “Positioning in the Cold War – Swedish and Danish History Textbooks and the Totalitarianism Doctrine” [41]).

The situation reversed in the mid-1980s, which was partly due to the general discussion of the famine in the West, incited by the publication of R. Conquest’s book “The Harvest of Sorrow”. Most prominent Danish scholar of Soviet repressions is historian Bent Jensen, who in his book “Gulag og Glemsel” (“Forget Gulag”) [26] devoted a chapter specifically to the Soviet famine. His research is based on the study of Soviet documents, archives and newspapers and is the first comprehensive account of the problem in the Danish historiography. B. Jensen also makes use of Western scholarship represented by such renowned scholars as R. Conquest, S. Wheatcroft and others; however, only a few Danish sources are used in this book, pointing at the existing gap in literature on this subject.

In Denmark, during a period of the so-called “value activism” in the 2000s, a historical and cultural battle took place after the Liberal-Conservative government initiated a discussion of Denmark’s role during the Cold War. As then the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it, “*from 1945 until the late 1980s, Denmark was in the shadow of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact*” [40]. A central question has been, and continues to be, whether or not the Cold War was actually a “war”, because, if it was, then the political disagreements of that time become a much more delicate question of national loyalty and moral treachery [17, 474]. This traditional ideological division is also reflected in teacher’s education, which is an explanation why the interpretation of history in the textbooks may vary depending on whether it is primary, secondary or high school in Denmark.

Swedish scholarship is represented by several fundamental papers on the topic. Swedish professor of



law J.W.F.Sundberg, who was appointed one of the six members of the International Committee investigating Holodomor in 1988-1990, published a number of articles on the Ukrainian famine in 1930s [42]. It is worth mentioning, that Sundbjerg disagreed with other members of the committee, who argued that the Ukrainian famine was not a genocide. His argument is based on Stalin's decree from January 1933, forbidding Ukrainians to leave Ukraine. It is known that thousands of Ukrainians fled the country to Russia, Belarus or Poland, but most of them were persecuted either as socio-revolutionists or Polish agents.

The newly discovered materials from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as from Division II of the Main Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (military intelligence) were published by The Institute of National Remembrance in Poland in 2009, containing comprehensive information about the situation in Ukraine [23]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw was receiving alarming reports about the intensification of visa applications submitted predominantly by workers and peasants with large families, who "pressed toward Poland only because people here are literally dying of hunger" [49, 50]. The Polish authorities were among the best-informed in Europe regarding events in Soviet Ukraine: of the 46 Polish military intelligence agencies operating in the USSR in 1927-39, at least 21 were located in the Ukrainian SSR [ibid, 49]. Given its position at that time, Warsaw, prioritized the nonaggression pact with the USSR signed on July 25, 1932. Roman Wysocki believes that the Polish government's silence, despite its awareness of the Ukrainian famine and the deaths of millions of Ukraine's inhabitants, stemmed from a powerful desire to establish and maintain good relations with the Soviet Union [49, 61].

Johan Dietsch, a Swedish scholar from Lund University, defended a PhD thesis "Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture" in 2006 [13]. He is an author of numerous publications on the politics of memory, comparing the commemoration of Holocaust and Holodomor. Similar approach has been applied by N. Dreyer in his study of Russian and Ukrainian official genocide narratives, drawing parallels between the two big tragedies of the XXth century [14]. The empirical basis of Johan Dietsch's research is represented by history textbooks, which reflect the official interpretation of Holodomor, since they are approved by the Ministry of Education. This way the Ukrainian officials become producers of historical narratives, or in a figurative sense authors [13, 39-40]. A red thread of Dietsch's research is the observation of a deliberate neglect of Holocaust tragedy in the Ukrainian history textbooks, which, he believes, could otherwise undermine the significance of Holodomor [13, 147].

Holodomor, apart from sometimes being called a "Ukrainian Holocaust" in spite of a rather problematic representation of the latter in the Ukrainian history textbooks, has also been referred to as Ukrainian *Gorta Mór* – in parallel to the Great Irish famine in 1845-1849 [24]. In a chapter "History and national identity construction: the Great Famine in Irish and Ukrainian history textbooks" J. G. Janmaat argues that both in Ireland and Ukraine textbook narratives on the Famine are characterised by a constant nationalist bias since the establishment of state independence [24, p. 80].

Conclusion. The aim with this article has been to demonstrate that political memory not only has wide and complex theoretical implications, walking into several disciplines, but also imperative practices which can act as either heroes or villains in the struggle for national identities. In doing so, the role of international recognition of Holodomor as genocide for Ukraine and Ukrainians has been discussed, which led to the conclusion that it has been crucial primarily for the historical narrative and historical memory which strongly influence the current self-perception of post-Soviet states. In this article, I looked at the genocide narratives in line with securitization theory inspired by M. Foucault's understanding of power as a discourse. The emerged genocidation framework can become a new approach to analysing post-bipolar and post-globalisation identity politics.

In Denmark and Sweden, the knowledge about "Ukrainian Holocaust" is limited to a few publications by Nordic scholars and translated works by prominent international scholars. This reflects a generally cautious approach in the Nordic countries towards a potentially sensitive issues related to the Soviet Union. Therefore, a considerable potential is also found in the future research of Nordic diplomatic archives and media covering the situation in the Soviet Union in 1930s.

To summarize, this article is an attempt to open a line of comparative research in Nordic historiography of the Soviet famines, taking a point of departure in identity discourse as part of a nation-building process (*lieux de mémoire*). However, Europe's future is undoubtedly reliant on the ability to transcend the narrow national *lieux de mémoire* discourses as technical political tools and to attain the wisdom of mutual understanding and forgiving.

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ПОЛІТИКА КОЛЕКТИВНОЇ ПАМ'ЯТІ: ОГЛЯД ІСТОРІОГРАФІЇ ПІВНІЧНОЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ КРАЇН ЩОДО УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ГОЛОДУ 1932-33 РОКІВ

Постановка проблеми. Окрім теоретичних підходів до міждисциплінарних досліджень політики пам'яті у постглобалізованому світі, важливо дослідити присутність українського голоду в північноєвропейській історіографії, вказуючи на існуючий пробіл в академічних дослідженнях на цю тему у північноєвропейських країнах.

Мета статті – з'ясувати як теоретичну, так і емпіричну основу для подальшого аналізу північноєвропейської історіографії радянського голоду 1930-х років.

Основні результати дослідження. Автором розкрито, що політична пам'ять має не лише широкі та складні теоретичні наслідки, переходячи до декількох дисциплін, але й імперативні практики, які можуть діяти як герої чи лиходії в боротьбі за національну ідентичність. Обговорено роль міжнародного визнання Голодомору як геноциду для України та українців, що призвело до висновку, що він має вирішальне значення насамперед для історичного наративу та історичної пам'яті, що сильно впливає на сучасне самосприйняття пострадянських країн. Створена концепція геноцидації може стати новим підходом до аналізу постбіполярної та постглобалізаційної політики ідентичності.

У Данії та Швеції знання про «український Голокост» обмежені кількома публікаціями північноєвропейських вчених та перекладеними творами видатних міжнародних учених. Це відображає загальний обережний підхід у скандинавських країнах до потенційно чутливих питань, пов'язаних із Радянським Союзом. Тому значний потенціал є і в майбутніх дослідженнях північноєвропейських дипломатичних архівів та ЗМІ, що висвітлюють ситуацію в Радянському Союзі в 1930-х роках.

Висновки. Підводячи підсумок, ця стаття є спробою відкрити напрям порівняльних досліджень у північноєвропейській історіографії радянських голодоморів, взявши за відправну точку дискурс про ідентичність як частину процесу націотворення (*lieux de mémoire*). Однак майбутнє Європи, безсумнівно, залежить від здатності подолати вузькі національні дискурси *lieux de mémoire* як технічного політичного інструментарію та здобути мудрість взаєморозуміння та прощення.

Ключові слова: колективна пам'ять, геноцидація, Голодомор, Україна, геноцид, радянський голод, північноєвропейська історіографія.

РОЗВИТОК ПРОДУКТИВНИХ СИЛ У СІЛЬСЬКОМУ ГОСПОДАРСТВІ УКРАЇНИ ДОБИ НЕПУ В КОНТЕКСТІ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ СІЛЬСЬКОГОСПОДАРСЬКОЇ КООПЕРАЦІЇ: ІСТОРІОГРАФІЯ КІНЦЯ 50-Х – ПОЧАТКУ 90-Х РР. ХХ СТ.

У статті висвітлено розвиток продуктивних сил у сільському господарстві України в контексті діяльності сільськогосподарської кооперації періоду нової економічної політики у вітчизняній історіографії кінця 1950-х – початку 1990-х рр. Доведено, що радянські дослідники, на відміну від зарубіжних науковців, загалом мало уваги звертали на кооперацію в українському селі як на цілісний господарський та соціальний організм, висуваючи на перший план лише так звані виробничі форми кооперації. Констатовано, що в історіографії 1920-х – початку 1950-х рр. проблема сільськогосподарської кооперації взагалі замовчувалась. Лише з другої половини 1950-х рр., особливо після ряду публікацій вченого-аграрника В. Данилова, інтерес науковців до сільськогосподарської кооперації поживався. Проте кардинально ситуація змінилася лише за часів «перебудови».

Ключові слова: історіографія, неп, селянство, селянські господарства, сільське господарство, сільськогосподарська кооперація.

Постановка проблеми. Подальший розвиток України як сучасної, соціальноорієнтованої європейської держави потребує модернізації аграрного сектору економіки. Його успішне реформування не можливе без урахування попереднього історичного досвіду. Більшість як вітчизняних, так і зарубіжних дослідників сходяться на тому, що виробничо-економічний, а отже і соціальний розвиток українського села 1920-х рр. носив прогресивний характер, а період нової економічної політики мав багато спільних рис із сучасною економічною моделлю. У зв'язку з цим спеціальний аналіз вітчизняного історичного досвіду функціонування сільського господарства України в добу непу є цілком доцільним, тим більше, що увага українського суспільства щодо подальших шляхів налагодження ефективного функціонування аграрного сектору народного господарства залишається гранично високою.

Історіографічне узагальнення, здатне покращити якість подальших аграрних студій, зумовлене значним нагромадженням історичних знань про розвиток сільськогосподарської кооперації в роки непу. Науковий інтерес до порушеної нами теми визначається необхідністю виокремлення різних концептуальних підходів, що сприятимуть акумулюванню і подальшому розвитку історичних знань із різних аспектів розвитку продуктивних сил в українському селі в роки непу.

Аналіз останніх досліджень і публікацій. До розкриття обраної нами для вивчення теми зверталися