



РЕВОЛЮЦІЙНІ ПОТРАСІННЯ ПОЧАТКУ ХХ СТ. СЕЛЯНСЬКИЙ ВИМІР ПОДІЙ

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REQUISITION POLICY OF AUSTRIA-GERMAN OCCUPYING ADMINISTRATION IN UKRAINIAN VILLAGES (FEBRUARY - DECEMBER 1918)*

In the article, the authors disclose the revisionary measures of the Austro-German War in Ukrainian villages in February - March 1918. It shows the attitude of the Austro-Germanic authorities to the Ukrainian peasantry, the mechanism of imposing and recovering the continuities, as well as the attitude of the population towards such activity.

Key words: *Ukrainian government, peasantry, requisition, Australian war, occupation administration.*

The statement of the issue. In 1918, Ukrainian lands became the scene of the curve of struggle and the volume economic policy of foreign countries. Being an “ally”, the Austro-German occupation administration in February - December 1918 carried out its own policy, which was in line with the policy of local government.

Research analysis. The theme outlined by us attracts the interest of historians [1-4, 6, 10, 17]. However, a special intelligence devoted to the revisionary activity of the Austro-Germanic administration in Ukrainian settlements in February - December 1918, remains absent, which is due to the urgency for the article of the topic.

The **purpose** of the article is to cover the requisition activities of Austria-Hungary and Germany in the Ukrainian village from February to December 1918.

The statement of the basic material. On February 9, 1918, the delegation of the UNR and representatives of the Fourth Alliance signed the Brest Peace Treaty. In the contract, the parties refused to claim damages, declared the exchange of prisoners, restored economic relations and committed to carry out commodity exchanges [1, 62]. The seventh article of the treaty determined the further

actions of the Ukrainian authorities and the Austro-German military command. It included the obligation of the parties to July 31, 1918, to exchange surpluses of agricultural products and industry. For a detailed examination of the issues of commodity exchange, on March 25, 1918, the Austro-German-Ukrainian Commission headed by Porsche, Fogach and Fon-Mumon began work in Kyiv. The result of the commission's work was the signing of a series of economic agreements and the harmonization of supply of products in the amount of 60 million pounds. cereals, 400 million eggs, 2 million 750 thousand poods of cattle, 1.5 million pood of potatoes [2, 203–204]. It was these agreements that had a decisive influence on the subsequent policies of Germany and Austria-Hungary in relation to the Ukrainian village.

By military support of the countries of the Fourth Alliance, Central Army troops entered Kyiv on March 1 [3, 243]. By fulfilling its obligations and pushing for the Bolshevik troops, the Austro-Hungarian and German troops were counting on the rapid implementation of food supply agreements. But the deals mentioned in the deals were difficult to carry out. There were several reasons for this: first, after the so-called socialization of land in the Ukrainian countryside, a real chaos began. In the village there were destructions of large “unprofit” farms, land area of more than 50 dessiatines. [4, 49]. By distributing the land of these farms, the state eliminated the only stable source of bread and other agricultural products. Secondly, the Ukrainian village, which was weakened by the Bolshevik's policy of overproduction, could not physically provide supplies in the amount laid down in the agreements. Thirdly, both parties, producing the texts of supply-side agreements, did not have statistical and economic data on the amount of bread in Ukraine.

At the end of February 1918, as soon as foreign military units entered the territory of Ukraine, they immediately became aware of their intentions. Since the arrival of the Austro-Hungarian and German military commanders in the occupied territories began to establish their own regime. The territory of Ukraine was divided into two spheres of influence. Austria-Hungary controlled in Volyn, Podillya, Kherson, Ekaterinoslav province, Germany - all the others, as well as Tavria and Crimea [5, 150]. In the occupied territories in provinces, counties, areas the military commandant's offices began to work. Officially acting in concert with the Ukrainian authorities, in fact, they were conducting their own activities. The main task of the Austro-Hungarian and German military command was to set up at any cost the supply of food to their own countries. Some representatives of the German military command offered to forcibly remove peasants from food. In a telegram, sent on March 9, 1918, by the

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German commander in Ukraine, the commander of the Eastern Front, it was recommended to increase the number of military contingents in Ukraine without which it was impossible to seize the amount of bread [6, 111]. To do this, they used all the methods.

For the effective functioning of the troops and support for its combat capabilities, it was necessary to provide complete food, hay and straw. The whole burden of holding the Austro-German army lay on the shoulders of the Ukrainian peasantry. The newly formed military commandant's offices, immediately after their foundation, began active requisitions, neglecting the rules of food purchases made by the peasants, made by the Ukrainian authorities. The central government agencies received reports from local authorities on the first unauthorized requisitions made by the Austrian and German military units on their way to the East.

Thus, the Makariv District, the People's Council of Kyiv District, by telegram dated February 27, 1918, reported that the representatives of local rural communities addressed the parish council and stated that the German troops who went to Kiev during the stop for the night arbitrarily took bread, hay, oats, Pigs issue receipts for this [5, 75].

Requests were made everywhere. Peasants, realizing that they sometimes take the last one, filed complaints with district commissars. Those, in turn, could only observe the situation and communicate information about events at a higher instance, waiting for instructions therefrom. On March 23, 1918, the Kyiv district commissar appealed to the provincial commissar informing him that a number of applications came from the villages of the Kiev district. They talked about the fact that German soldiers voluntarily enter the villages and take all the things that they get into their hands. It was difficult for the Ukrainian authorities to explain to the peasants such actions by the Allied forces, therefore it was not surprising to see the loss of power by the peasants' trust, which they often identified with the German-Austrian administration.

Heightened by Bolshevik's agitation, and feeling the impotence of local government peasants made attempts to protect their own interests alone. So, in the village of Marholevka during an attempt to confiscate property by German soldiers, several villagers opposed such actions. In the battle two German soldiers were killed. After that, a German unit of 100 people surrounded the village, selected five horses, carts, and raped women who had not managed to escape from the village. In the Mikhailivka village, the Germans held the requisition and did not receive any receipts and money, thus setting up the local population against them. The Romanov rural council reported that the Germans were acting without presenting the orders of the current Ukrainian authorities.

What is important is the fact that the Germans took not only bread, but also precious things and personal belongings, thus plundering the population. This was stated in the message of the Belgorod district council. There are also numerous reports that products were picked up without weight determination, castles were torn down in barns, money and valuable clothes were taken away [7, 18]. The situation was similar in other regions of Ukraine. The peasants took even the last. The inhabitants of Austropolitan units of the Krasnopolye Tiraspol district demanded 1000 pounds of grains The peasants were able to collect only 450 pounds, after

which the Austrians walked all the houses, requiring even the bread needed for personal use [8].

Similar activity of foreign troops was fixed in the Kharkiv region. Residents of villages suffered from requisites, which increased significantly in April. These facts are evidenced by numerous complaints from the peasantry of the Kharkiv Region contained in documentary sources. Thus, in a complaint dated April 26, 1918, residents of the village of Malichi Passages of the Lipetsk parish of the Kharkiv district, in the name of the Kharkov commissar of the Central Council, reported: "German soldiers arrive in our village daily, rob, carry out illegal requisitions of hay, livestock and other products, break the castles, take everything that falls into their eyes, sometimes give a little money, and in most cases, they do not pay anything. When requisitions, they do not make any warrant, no one addresses; they themselves go in the yards and take everything. This strongly harassed our citizens, who are now starving, because they took bread and hay, did not deprive citizens of anything. April 22 this year eight German soldiers of the 110th German heavy artillery division came to us and took 80 pounds. hay, given one rub. for a pound and went away. "[9, 26]. Under the pressure of economic obligations to the countries of the Fourth Alliance, the government forced the peasants to issue food supplies that they illegally seized from public stores. Such confiscations were made by the commissars of the Central Council with the help of German troops. The peasants returned food, livestock, and rationale, although there was no official order to return [10, 98]. The occupying power, in its aspirations to ensure uninterrupted flow of goods, was guided by such brutal methods.

Requisitions and all kinds of confiscation of property were carried out with the use of brute force. Often such actions were the nature of this terror. Thus, in the report of the provincial revolutionary council of Novopokrovsky rural district council reported: "that in the Novopokrovsky district there were units of the Austro-German troops armed with machine guns and rifles. They came to the villages, gathered the peasants, stitching them in the ranks, beat the whistles dragged along the ground, shot them down. "[11, 35-36]. Similar incidents occurred in almost every county, causing a violent reaction of the population, especially peasants. The latter tried in every way to avoid giving food, constantly sabotaging the requisition campaign launched by the Austro-Germanic administrations and representatives of the Ukrainian authorities. In many counties, peasants' armed demonstrations broke out against the German-Austrian troops. The German and Austrian authorities began to apply the practice of military indemnities and fines to bring order and suppress the speeches of the peasants. Such activity contradicted the Ukrainian legislation, which did not have the appropriate regulatory framework for the application of indemnity. Contradictions were imposed on various types of guilty and misconduct of the peasants.

For example, the inhabitants of one of the villages of the Khorol district fired a German unit, which subsequently confiscated many hidden weapons. For this misdemeanor the village has an indemnity of 5000 rubles and a large amount of life supplies [7, 25]. Often, the Ukrainian authorities took part in suppressing various performances and collecting contributions. In those



villages where peasants raised performances, a punitive detachment of Ukrainians and Germans was sent to restore order [12, 8]. For the most part, the indemnity was charged with money, sometimes with food and other valuable things, which at their total cost equaled the amount of indemnity. Due to constant outrageous “Allied troops”. At the end of April, the Central Rada and the Council of Ministers began to lose confidence and support of the population.

The inability of the Ukrainian authorities to fulfill the conditions of the economic agreement with the countries of the Fourth Alliance has affected the position of Austria-Hungary and Germany regarding the UNR. These countries were interested in a strong, authoritative power, which the Central Rada and the government, unfortunately, were not. The Central Council’s mistakes in the internal economic policy, the contradictions within the Ukrainian political system, led to the activation of the opposition forces. On April 29, 1918, P. Skoropadskyi was elected to Ukraine at the congress of grain workers of the Hetman of all Ukraine [2, 28]. The new government had to fulfill its food supply commitments to the Central Powers.

In fact, the Hetmanate’s power was under the influence of the Austro-German military occupation administration. Last, as is known, was intended in any way to adjust the flow of agricultural products, especially food to Austria-Hungary and Germany. In this regard, the Austro-German troops launched a large campaign for harvesting bread, using requisitioning. Such actions contradicted the “Mandatory Decree of the Minister of Food” dated May 30, 1918, which stated that “no one except the representatives of the State Bread Bureau and their agents has the right to procure from the population bread and grain of the harvest of 1917 p.” [7, 66]. For the effective functioning of the occupation forces and the maintenance of their combat capabilities, it was necessary to provide complete food security, hay and straw. The newly formed military commandant’s offices, immediately after their foundation, began active requisitions, ignoring the rules of food procurement from peasants, approved by the Ukrainian authorities. Such actions are evidenced by numerous reports from local authorities of the Ukrainian State.

Thus, on January 20, 1918, Katerynoslav provincial governor informed the authorized Ukrainian government under the Austro-German command: “Many villages of the Mariupol district receive many complaints of the collection of bread by German troops without documents, if such requisitions continue, then those villages will be left without bread. In addition, there are a lot of complaints about the troops set for their needs, the duty of delivery of the boat. Some villages are required to deliver up to 100 or more troops on an orderly basis every day. If such a conscription will not be removed from the population at the time of collecting bread, it will greatly affect the harvest” [7, 230]. On July 13, 1918, the Kherson provincial governor drew the attention of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian State to the “extraordinary danger to the general peace of unauthorized requisites of the most intrusive articles of a massive nature” [13, 120]. The situation was similar in other regions of Ukraine.

In many villages, especially if their territories were bordered with villages of other counties, attempts at double requisition took place. Mykhailivskiy rural district council of Ekaterinoslav province reported to Mariupol

district old age that “July 20 / August 6 in. Mikhailivka Mariupol district of the Katerynoslav province arrived from Yuzivka, an Austro-German detachment of 45 horses, 150 soldiers with officers. They required 100 barrels of straw, 60 hawks of hay, 10 potatoes, 60 wheat breads, 2000 eggs, 60 pounds of fat, 35 geese, 5 boars, 500 pounds of wheat, 800 pounds. barley, and 100 pounds of Wheat, 6 pounds of tea, 1 pound of tobacco, 3 pounds of cabbages and 100 cargoes from the village to send the cargo. The requirements could not be fulfilled because of. Mikhailovka already had requisitioning, besides, there was an order of the Austrian authorities in the village of Nikolsky, Pavlovsky region of Mariupol district, that without their knowledge, no extradition to the Austro-German troops was conducted, as was said to German officers “[14, 23]. According to the sources worked out by us, sometimes the requisition was accompanied by a real terror, in which not only the occupation forces but also the Hetman detachments participated. “Haydamaky fled the village, made some notes on some huts. The Germans approached and set fire on all sides, not allowing anything to be taken out of the houses. One house was burnt, and dozens burned down. With one peasant (a very polite person) did this: ordered a dinner for officers, the mistress treated them very well, and they thanked - they brought out all valuable things from the house and then burned the hut. “ Such was described by the rural teacher of one of the villages of Zolotonsky district [15, 259]. At the end of summer 1918 the requisition of the Austro-German troops became massive. Feeling the crisis, which was aggravated in the middle of the Ukrainian state and lack of food, the Austro-German occupation administration tried to maximize the flow of food from the population of the occupied Ukrainian territories. There was a sharp need not only in food, but also in horses that were so necessary for the army. Thus, the German commandant Heisberg issued an order to all the villages of the Borovsky region of the Rilsky district of the Chernihiv province, where, by October 15, 1918 (according to the old style), the peasants were obliged to bring in 30 Rilsk adults with a strong average height of horses [16, 205]. This requirement of content caused the dissatisfaction of the peasants not only with the activities of the Austro-German administration, but also with the Hetman regime, which was associated with the occupiers. Even the interior minister was compelled to admit that the Hetman saw the German agent [17, 72]. The authorities resorted to repressions against the peasants. The military, as a rule, did not search specifically the perpetrators, but punished the village community as a whole. Soldiers robbed peasant homes. The practice of contributing has become widespread. Without an appropriate regulatory framework for the use of indemnities, Hetman was compelled to agree to the use of the laws on indemnities adopted by the countries of the Fourth Alliance [18, 137].

Often, the amount of the indemnity was very high. The Austro-Germanic administration ignored the real financial and economic opportunities of the villagers. So, residents of. the village Bagata Chernetka, where the killer of the ataman of the provincial police, and the killers were not found, paid 100,000 rubles of indemnities. In addition, with the consent of the chairman of the commission on the alienation of the remains of bread and county old age, they had requisitioned 400 pounds of wheat, 400 pounds of oats and 22 hairs of straw [6, 81]



Money collected from the peasants, as the indemnity by the Austro-German administration, was transferred to the local treasuries. The smaller part of them went to the needs of the occupation troops. In connection with this, the Zolotonsky district chief noted: "The German government has taken a monetary indemnity from the villages of Velikaya Burimka - 30,000 rubles, Malaya Burimka - 15,000 rubles., Great Kaniv 987 rubles. 75 kopecks From this amount the Germans took 10,000 rubles. for own needs, while others 60877 rubles. stored at me. "[19, 5]. Especially large amounts of indemnities and fines were imposed on the population for various unlawful actions: the murder of Austrian and German soldiers, concealment of weapons, armed protest, Bolshevik agitation. So, July 22, 1918 in the village. The secretary of Trudeh region has arrived the Austrougorsk subdivision and has paid a indemnity in the amount of 10,000 rubles. and 1000 pounds. flour for failure to comply with the order to extradite criminals guilty of the murder of four Austrian soldiers. The same unit was charged a stipend of 20,000 rubles. and 1000 pounds. flour for the lack of rifles and arrested eight peasants [14, 45]. For certain crimes (destruction of railways), the indemnities were imposed not only on separate villages, but also on the whole area. After the collapse of August 8, 1918, a railway canvas between the Zhmerinka and Yaroshenko stations of the Odesa-Kyiv line, Austrian soldiers, who searched the perpetrators and did not find them, laid the indemnity on the villages located near the accident. In particular on the village. Stanislavchik - 250,000 rubles., Malu Zhmerinka - 18,000 pounds. flour, on. The Buddies - 250,000 rubles. The peasants could not pay the latter amount because the number of inhabitants was smaller than in other villages (80 households or 1,000 people). For this, the Austrian military took all the horses - 169 heads and 50 cows. In this way, the villagers were deprived of the opportunity to prepare the soil before winter crops [20, 117]. The sabotage of requisition, appeals for revolts, and Bolshevik agitation also served as grounds for imposing indemnities. The mass peasant unrest by the Austro-German troops was severely suppressed, and the indemnities were distributed among the participants of the uprising. Thus, for the residents of the villages of Lomozova, Kulovki, Nizhnyi Olchedayevka, Irkalyenko, Kanivka traces, and Berezovka, for their participation in the uprising, a contingency was imposed, which developed among all the settlements in which the participants of the uprising lived [21, 41].

The conclusions. Thus, during February - December 1918, the Austro-German administration launched a large-scale re-requisition campaign, regardless of the real socio-economic situation of the peasants of Ukraine. The protests of the Ukrainian authorities were also ignored. During the ten months of 1918, so-called Allies became invaders. If during the activity of the Central Council the intervention was less significant, then at the time of Hetman the Austro-German troops behaved like hosts in this territory.

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УДК 94:323.272(447.4) «1918»
DOI: 10.31651/2413-8142-2019-21-9-14**РЕКВИЗИЦІЙНА ПОЛІТИКА АВСТРО-НІМЕЦЬКОЇ ОКУПАЦІЙНОЇ АДМІНІСТРАЦІЇ В УКРАЇНСЬКОМУ СЕЛІ (ЛЮТИЙ – ГРУДЕНЬ 1918 Р.)****Н. А. Ковальова***кандидат історичних наук, доцент, доцент кафедри українознавства Українського державного хіміко-технологічного університету*

Постановка проблеми. У 1918 р. українські землі стали ареною кривавої боротьби різних політичних сил за владу та об'єктом економічної політики іноземних держав військово-політичні інтереси яких визначали ставлення до пересічного населення. Будучи військовим «союзником», австро-німецька окупаційна адміністрація у лютому – грудні 1918 р. проводила власну політику, яка йшла у розріз із політикою української власної влади. Окреслена тема приверте інтерес низки як радянських так і сучасних істориків, що вивчали різні аспекти взаємодії окупаційних військ. Їх увага переважно зосереджувалася на репресивних заходах військ, каральних операціях проти українського населення та боротьбою з радянськими військами. Однак, спеціальної розвідки, присвяченій реквизиційній діяльності австро-німецької адміністрації в українському селі у лютому – грудні 1918 рр., покищо немає, чим і обумовлена актуальність обраної для статті теми. Інший аспект актуальності пояснюється необхідністю нагромадження історичних знань з вказаного історичного періоду.

Метою статті є висвітлення реквизиційної діяльності Австро-Угорщини та Німеччини в українському селі з лютого по грудень 1918 р.

Основні результати дослідження. У статті, автори розкривають реквизиційні заходи австро-німецьких військ в українському селі у лютому – березні 1918 р. Авторами аналізуються передумови реквизиційної діяльності окупаційних військ у контексті загальної політики національних урядів Центральної Ради та Гетьманату. Показано ставлення австро-німецької влади до українського селянства. Авторами наводяться приклади, щодо причин реквизиційної політик. Також вивчається, механізм накладання та стягнення контрибуцій. Акцентується увага на ставленні населення до такої діяльності.

Висновки. Упродовж лютого – грудня 1918 р. австро-німецька адміністрація розгорнула широкомасштабну реквизиційну кампанію, не рахуючись із реальним соціально-економічним становищем селян України. Протести української влади також ігнорувалися. За десять місяців 1918 р. так звані союзники перетворилися в окупантів. Якщо за часів діяльності Центральної Ради втручання було менш значним, то за часів Гетьмана австро-німецькі війська вели себе як господарі на даній території.

Ключові слова: українська влада, селянство, реквизиції, контрибуції, австро-німецькі війська, окупаційна адміністрація.

ПОВСТАННЯ НА КИЇВЩИНІ ВЛІТКУ 1918 Р.: АПРОБАЦІЯ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ ПРОГРАМИ СЕЛЯНСЬКОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ В НАДДНІПРЯНСЬКІЙ УКРАЇНІ

У статті проаналізовано передумови й розвиток селянського повстанського руху у Київській губернії у червні – серпні 1918 р., висвітлено участь сільського населення у збройних формуваннях. Встановлено, що це була стихійно реалізована політична програма селянської революції (участь селянства в захопленні влади), яка розроблялася соціалістами-революціонерами та соціал-демократами на початку ХХ ст.

Ключові слова: селянство, повстання, Вільне козацтво, Звенигородський повіт, Таращанський повіт, політична програма, селянська революція.

Постановка проблеми. У розвитку селянської революції в Наддніпрянській Україні після 1917 р. важливо визначити той рубіж, коли селянська боротьба набула політичного характеру. Якщо протягом 1917 – на початку 1918 рр. тривало протистояння селянства з поміщицтвом на ґрунті перетозподілу землі й власності, то зі встановленням політичного режиму Гетьманату П. Скоропадського розпочалися відкриті виступи за участі селян проти органів державної влади. У розвитку селянської революційності влітку 1918 р. можна виокремити такі напрями: сутички під час роззброєння селян австро-німецькими військами; конфлікти під час повернення власності поміщикам; повстання з метою захоплення влади. Масові повстання політичного характеру були організовані на Київщині за підтримки партії українських лівих есерів і на Чернігівщині з ініціативи ЦК КП(б)У. Якщо перше повстання переслідувало мету відновлення УНР і влади Центральної Ради, то друге – встановлення радянської влади (пролетарської) за активної участі селянства.

Аналіз останніх досліджень і публікацій. Радянська історіографія селянські повстання 1918 р. вивчала з точки зору класової боротьби і надавала перевагу висвітленню каральної політики німецьких і австро-угорських військ [див., напр.: 1] або ж героїчній боротьбі партизан-більшовиків. Стереотипи радянської історіографії про керівну роль більшовицької партії спростував П. Захарченко, який оцінив селянсько-повстанський рух як «селянська війна» і схарактеризував його основні етапи [2]. Організаційну роль Вільного козацтва у розвитку повстанського руху на Київщині влітку 1918 р. висвітлено у працях В. Лободаєва [3; 4]. Спробу з'ясувати ступінь залученості селянства до повстанської боротьби в українському селі в 1918 р. зроблено Б. Малиновським [5]. Причини поразки селянських виступів влітку 1918 р. проаналізовано Р. Пирогом [6, 249–250]. Ураховуючи, що

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